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1 Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.  I am grateful for comments received
from numerous colleagues at the University of Michigan Law School and from the participants at the
Columbia Law & Economics Workshop and the participants at the Legal Transitions Conference at the
University of San Diego Institute for Law and Philosophy.  Financial support for this project came from
the Elkes Fund and the Cook Fund at the University of Michigan Law School.
2 The terms “retroactivity” and “prospectivity” are notoriously imprecise.  One way of
understanding them is relative to each other.  Thus, if a legal transition is applied retroactively, it will
have a higher probability of affecting pretransition investments (or will have larger effect on, or will
reach more of, such investments) than if the law change is applied prospectively.  A more precise
taxonomy, however, is possible.  For example, a “nominally prospective” tax change is one that applies
only to future tax returns, although such a change can have retroactive effects on the value of investment
made before the change occurred if those investments produce income or expenses over several years. 
To make a tax change “fully prospective,” some sort of grandfather rule would need to be included as
well.  By contrast, to make a tax change “nominally retroactive” would be to apply the new rule to all
pre-transition tax years, not just to pre-transition investments.  See generally Michael J. Graetz, Legal
Transitions: The Case for Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 47, 49-50  (1977)
Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, and Legal Progress
Kyle D. Logue1
I. Introduction
This Article focuses on two questions that bear critically on the choice of a welfare-maximizing
transition policy.  First, under what circumstances will private parties – whether individuals or firms –
make unbiased assessments of the likelihood and nature of legal change and of the transition policy that
will be applied?  Second, should legal change be expected, over the long run, to move in a desirable
direction?  To put this second question differently, in what areas or with respect to what types of law
can we assume that there will be “legal progress”?  As it turns out, according to the consequentialist
framework that has come to dominate legal scholarship on transition issues, how these two sets of
questions are answered will determine whether certain types of legal change should be applied
retroactively or prospectively and, more generally, the extent to which the government should seek to
eliminate transition losses and gains.2
2
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(coining terms “nominal retroactivity” and “nominal prospectivity”); Louis Kaplow, An Economic
Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 509, 515-16 (1986) (using same terms); and Daniel
Shaviro, When Rules Change: An Economic and Political Analysis of Transition Relief and Retroactivity
104-15 (2000) (adopting similar terminology and discussing implications of “anti nominal retroactivity”
norm in tax legislative context). 
2
Part II briefly summarizes the consequentialist framework for analyzing legal transitions.  It
focuses on one key (and, to my mind, under-emphasized) aspect of that framework: the fact that
transition norms can usefully be analogized to tort liability rules and thus can be evaluated on the basis
of their effects on incentives and risk-bearing.  Part III then brings a behavioralist perspective to the
economic transitions framework.  Specifically, if the possibility of various cognitive biases are taken
seriously, any incentive-based approach to transition policy will encounter problems.  This behavioralist
qualification may have special force when the law in question affects the decisions of individuals rather
than businesses.  The intuition here is that business corporations face evolutionary competitive pressures
that will over the long run (an important qualification) tend to weed out firms that systematically mis-
estimate risks, including the risk of legal change; whereas, individuals do not face the same sort of
competitive, evolutionary pressures.  A tentative conclusion that follows from this intuition is that, if
policymakers are going to rely on incentive-based justifications of a given transition norm, the argument
will be most persuasive in contexts involving corporate actors – or other commercially sophisticated
actors who face similar competitive pressures.  This conclusion, of course, must be qualified by the fact
that corporations have their own sources of decision-making bias, some of which may persist over the
long run.  In any event, one conclusion of this Article’s analysis is that, with respect to laws that
primarily affect individual rather than corporate incentives, policymakers should be suspicious of
incentive-based justifications of alternative transition policies, or for that matter of alternative tort liability
rules or other legal rules.  The focus should instead be on other considerations, such as distributional
concerns. 
A final resolution of the issues raised in Part III, which have importance not only for transition
policy but for legal rules generally, will depend on the further development of empirical and
experimental research on biases in human decision-making.  Part IV, however, raises a conceptual
3
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3 There also is a type of legal transition with respect to which the legal progress assumption is
sometimes irrelevant: transitions that actually destroy property or, more precisely, cause property to
decline in value in ways that cannot be restored by a reversal of the transition in question.  For such
“destructive transitions,” it is possible to fashion an incentive-based argument for retroactivity that
ignores the legal progress issue, although the reasonable expectations assumption will still be important. 
See infra Part IV.
3
problem that is peculiar to the economic analysis of legal transitions and that raises profound difficulties
for the incentive-based case for retroactivity.  According to the economic transitions framework, the
best argument for applying a legal change retroactively relies on the anticipatory incentive effects on
private actors: If legal change is expected to be applied retroactively, private parties will be induced to
anticipate that change, and this anticipation can lead to a beneficial form of cost-internalization.  This
incentive-based or anticipation-based argument, however, depends entirely on the assumption that legal
change can be expected over the long run to move in a desirable direction, that the law will make
progress over time.  As a result, the incentive-based justification for retroactivity works, if at all, only
for certain types of legal change.  For one example, sometimes legal change will be prompted when
new and better information reveals that the original law was based on a factual mistake or
misunderstanding of the situation.  With respect to that type of legal change, there is an efficiency
argument for retroactivity to give private parties the incentive to anticipate such policy adjustments or
error corrections.  
For some other types of legal change, however, the anticipation-based story generally has little
to say.  For example, when legal change occurs merely because there is a change in the political power
structure – say, the Republicans boot the Democrats out of office, or vice versa – the anticipation-
based argument for a retroactivity norm has little force.  This is because, in circumstances in which legal
change is best understood as the product of a game of political tug-of-war (such as the flip-flopping of
control that can occur in a democratic country that is closely divided on ideological issues), the notion
of legal progress may just not make sense.3  For that sort of legal change, the focus should be less on
incentives and more on minimizing risks of expropriation, a shift in focus that would seem to counsel for
significant limits on retroactive legal change.  The upshot of all this, then, is that perhaps the biggest
4
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4challenge for transitions theory will be to distinguish categories of legal change that can be characterized
as legal progress in some objective sense – for example, those changes that involve error correction or
uncertainty resolution – from those that involve pure shifts in political power or ideology.  Most
transitions, of course, involve some combination of these characterizations (that is, they are in part
political shifts and in part error corrections or responses to unforeseen circumstances).   As a result,
often the best transition rule will be some intermediate transition norm, something between pure
retroactivity and pure prospectivity.  
A tentative conclusion of this Part’s legal-progress analysis is that the incentive-based
justification for the use of a retroactivity transition norm is strongest in situations in which the transition in
question involves (or has the characteristics of) incremental changes in the common law, especially
changes that reflect the incorporation of a new scientific discovery or a newly developing consensus
within the scientific community.  This conclusion admittedly depends on optimistic accounts both of
incremental decision making and of scientific progress.  This conclusion also supports and reinforces the
longstanding tradition of courts’ applying new product liability decisions retroactively.  The analysis of
this Part also supports the application of a retroactivity norm to regulatory and even to legislative
change, in cases in which those changes have the characteristics of common law decision-
making, characteristics of “error correction” or “uncertainty resolution.”  There is a critical sense, for
example, in which that certain types of tax-law change – namely, moves by either Congress or the
Treasury Department to identify and eliminate abusive tax shelters – can be usefully analogized to the
incremental change embodied in common law adjudication, including the products liability context. 
What follows from this analogy is that, as with the case for retroactivity with respect to incremental
change in the area of product safety regulation, there is a fairly strong incentive-based argument for
nominal retroactivity with respect to the elimination of unintended tax loopholes, or opportunities for
self-serving and abusive interpretations of the tax law.  Interestingly, the current transition norm for such
tax changes is almost precisely the opposite: When a tax shelter or loophole is explicitly eliminated by
Congress or by the Treasury, the change is almost always made nominally prospective.
The other major conclusion of this Article’s analysis is that, insofar as we cannot confidently
5
Logue:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2003
4 Transition issues arise only when the legal change is unexpected by private parties.  Thus, if
Congress were to enact a tax provision that was scheduled to expire on a particular date, the expiration
of that law according to the original schedule would not produce a legal “change” under this definition,
assuming the expiration was expected.  By contrast, if it were expected that the legislature would vote
to extend the law (say, that had been the practice for many years with respect to other expiring tax
provisions), then the failure to extend the provision would be a legal change.
5 Louis Kaplow, Transition Policy: A Conceptual Framework, J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
p.2 (2003).
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identify areas of law where progress is to be expected, and insofar as we cannot have confidence in the
rational expectations assumption, perhaps the focus on incentive-based justifications of alternative
transition policies should be redirected.  That is, perhaps consequentialist transitions scholarship should
focus not on the deterrence side of the framework but on the insurance and distributional side.  For the
most part, I leave that task for another day.
II. The Consequentialist Transitions Framework
In the literature on legal transitions, the term “transition policy” is generally understood to mean
a rule or norm that influences policymakers’ decisions concerning the extent to which legal change
should be accompanied by transition relief.  Legal change within this framework is defined broadly, and
somewhat counter-intuitively, to include any resolution of the uncertainty regarding what the law will be
in the future or how the law will be applied to future circumstances.  Thus, a legal change would
obviously include an unexpected repeal of a tax provision, such as the home-mortgage interest
deduction, or a shift in tort law from a negligence or fault-based regime to a strict liability regime.4 
Perhaps less obviously, however, a legal change will also be said to have occurred under this
framework in circumstances in which the statutory law or the formal common law rule remains
unchanged, but is applied in some way or to some circumstance that the relevant private parties were
not expecting.  Thus, “a transition issue [and hence the need to choose a transition policy] will be said
to arise whenever an act has future consequences and the legal regime applicable to those future
consequences is not known with certainty at the outset.”5  
6
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6 The particular form of consequentialism that dominates transitions scholarship, and that
dominates normative law-and-economics scholarship generally, is sometimes called “welfarism.” 
Welfarist policy analysis evaluates alternative public policies on the basis of their ability to maximize
social welfare, which is defined as being some function of the well-being of individuals’ in society.  For
example, utilitarianism, a type of welfarism, employs a social welfare function that maximizes the sum of
all individuals’ subjective well-beings.  For the purposes of this paper, when I use the term
consequentialist I generally mean welfarist.
7 Graetz, supra note 2.
8 Kaplow, supra note 2.
6
Transition relief can take a number of forms, from grandfather rules or phase-ins to direct
compensation for transition losses.  Real-world transition polices include the common law tradition of
applying new judicial interpretations of law retroactively, the legislative norm of applying legislative
changes nominally prospectively, and the constitutional law principle of providing compensation for
government “takings” of private property for public use.  All transition policies, if they are effective,
have a quasi-constitutional character, in the sense that they limit the ways in which future government
decision-makers can apply new laws across time.  With some types of transitions, this means that the
transition policymaker will be making quasi-constitutional rules to bind itself or some future version of
itself.  An example of this would be the informal norm within Congress that calls generally for making
tax-law changes prospective.  With other types of transitions, however, one decision-maker in some
sense makes the transition policy, which is in turn applied to constrain or limit the actions of some other
government decision-maker.  An obvious example of this would be the constitutional prohibition against
uncompensated government takings, a prohibition that limits the actions of a wide range of government
officials, who in turn had no say in the creation of the rule.    
Most of the legal scholarship on transition issues produced in the past 25 years has adopted a
consequentialist framework that focuses on the economic and political consequences of alternative
transition policies.6  This transitions framework originated in the tax scholarship of Michael Graetz,7 was
first fully developed and generalized to a range of legal fields by Louis Kaplow,8 and received perhaps
7
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9 Shaviro, supra note 2.  Numerous authors besides Graetz, Kaplow, and Shaviro have made
important contributions to the consequentialist framework.  For a review of this literature, see Saul
Levmore, Retroactive Taxation, 3 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 340-44
(1998); Kaplow, supra note 2; Shaviro, supra note 2.  It is fair to say, however, that the transition
scholarship of Graetz, Kaplow, and Shaviro have been especially influential.  Although there is
significant overlap among the three, there are important differences as well.  For example, Graetz’s
1977 article, which was pathbreaking in many ways, was more narrowly focused on tax law than the
transitions scholarship of either Kaplow or Shaviro.  Graetz’s analysis, however, at least purported to
incorporate non-utilitarian sorts of arguments; whereas, Kaplow and Shaviro’s analyses were explicitly
welfarist.  Kaplow’s article appeared almost 10 years after Graetz’s, but it was the first to develop a
comprehensive economic framework for analyzing transitions of many types and was the first explicitly
to introduce the analogy of transition norms to liability rules.  Although Kaplow did address public-
choice issues, which he called “institutional concerns,” as well as distributional issues, those parts of his
analysis were emphasized somewhat less compared to his efficiency analysis.  Shaviro’s book,
however, which owes a considerable debt to the work of Graetz and Kaplow, seeks more fully to
integrate the public-choice, distributional, and efficiency issues into a single framework.  
10 Kaplow, supra note 2, at 522; Shaviro, supra note 2, at 27.
11 Graetz, supra note 2; Kaplow, supra note 2; Shaviro, supra note 2.  This position is
sometimes called the “new view” in contrast to the so-called “old view,” which focuses more on
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its most exhaustive treatment in a recent book by Daniel Shaviro.9   The normative questions that these
and other transition scholars have focused on are:  under what circumstances should there be a
transition policy of providing relief or compensation for the losses caused by unexpected legal change
(or, symmetrically, a policy of taxing windfall gains); and under what circumstances should there be a
policy of no relief or only partial relief.  
The consequentialist transitions framework has developed into a complex blend of economic
and political considerations.  The economic side borrows heavily from the economic analysis of legal
default rules, such as tort liability rules.  This part of the framework concentrates on the incentive and
risk-bearing (“deterrence” and “insurance”) effects of alternative transition policies.10  For example, the
now famous argument in favor of a pro-retroactivity transition norm in certain settings – associated with
Graetz and Kaplow – builds on the idea that such a norm, if made credible (that is, if made in some
sense binding on future government decision-makers), would give private parties an incentive to
anticipate legal change.11  Thus, if taxpayers have reason to believe that Congress will apply tax-law
8
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fairness and reliance concerns and tended to disfavor retroactivity generally.  Levmore, supra note 9. 
12 Thus, Saul Levmore has called this the “anticipation-based” new view of legal change, in
contrast to the more “reliance-based” old-view perspective.  Levmore, Changes, Anticipations,
Reparations, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1657 (1999).
13 Kaplow, supra note 2, at 536-58; Shaviro, supra note 2, at 36-43.
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changes retroactively to pre-transition investments, those taxpayers will have an incentive to anticipate
such rule changes and adjust their investments accordingly.  In other words, a transition policy of
making tax-law changes retroactive would have the effect of forcing taxpayers to internalize the costs of
those changes in their ex ante investment decisions.12  
That is the deterrence or incentive part of the consequentialist framework.  As for the insurance
part, a pro-retroactivity tax-transition policy would also allocate the risk of retroactive tax-law changes
to the private parties who invest in reliance on the old law.  If those parties are risk averse, they can
shed or reduce that transition risk in some way.  By contrast, if the government adopts a transition
policy of providing transition relief for certain types of transition losses (say, government compensation
for takings of private property for public use), such a policy can be understood as a form of
government-provided insurance.13  Thus, the consequentialist analysis of transition policy focuses on the
question what transition policy creates the most efficient ex ante investment incentives for private parties
as well as the efficient allocation of transition risk.  
In addition to deterrence and insurance concerns, the consequentialist framework also
considers distributional issues, both unintentional redistribution and intentional redistribution.  Recall first
that whenever there is a rule change not accompanied by full transition relief there will inevitably be
some redistribution away from those who made investments in reliance on the old law and toward
anyone who benefits from the rule change.  Thus, with any uncompensated legal transition, a
redistributive transfer is made from the new losers to the new winners.  To the extent that such
redistribution is an unintentional byproduct of legal change, the consequentialist framework would
analyze it as a pure insurance question– that is, a question of transition risk. An example of this sort of
redistribution would be a government taking of an individual’s property for public use.  With such a
9
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14 Kaplow, supra note 2, at 519.
15 Shaviro, supra note 2, at 37.
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taking, there is no (or should be no) intent on the part of the government to reduce the homeowner’s
wealth per se; the government just happens to need that piece of property.14  However, to the extent
the resulting redistribution is intentional (that is, to the extent the reason for the policy change is to
reduce the wealth of the party disadvantaged by the transition), such redistribution must be evaluated on
its own terms, as a matter of distributive justice.  An example of this sort of intentional redistribution
would be an increase in property taxes that is intended to fall disproportionately on wealthy individuals.
At this point, the consequentialist transitions framework looks very much like the
consequentialist framework for analyzing legal rules generally.  Again, the focus on deterrence and
insurance (and to some extent even the consideration of distributional issues) draws heavily from the
standard economic analysis of legal rules in torts, contracts, and property law – but especially in the
area of products liability law.15  What makes the consequentialist analysis of transition issues uniquely
complex, however, is the necessity of simultaneously considering not only the efficiency and
distributional issues just mentioned, but also issues of public choice or interest group politics.  Public-
choice scholarship can be understood as the application of the rational-actor expected-utility-
maximizing model of economics to the study of government actors and government institutions.  In the
study of static legal rules (at least in the private law context), public-choice concerns can be, and usually
are, ignored.   Accordingly, the standard economic analysis of the choice between a negligence or a
strict liability rule in tort focuses entirely on deterrence and insurance concerns and never asks the
question how will each rule affect the lobbying activity of potential injurers and victims.  And that makes
perfect sense.  The same reasonable simplifying assumption, however, cannot be made when the
“liability rule” in question is one that allocates the costs of policy changes, changes that are made
through political action.  Accordingly, consequentialist transition scholars evaluate transition norms not
only for their effects on the incentives of private actors but also for their effects on the incentives of
political actors, whether those actors are government officials making decisions about public policy or
private parties seeking to influence those decisions.  
10
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16 Lawrence Blume & Daniel Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72
Cal. L. Rev. 569, 620-22 (1984); Lawrence Blume, Daniel Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, The Taking of
Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q. J. Econ.71, 88-90 (1984); and Frank Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation' Law, 80
Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1218 (1967).
17 Kaplow, supra note 2, at 567-71. 
18 Daryl Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345, 355-56 (2000). 
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With respect to affecting the incentives of government actors, some scholars have argued that a
norm of compensation for government takings of private property has the benefit of forcing government
officials to internalize the full social costs of their decisions.16  Others within the consequentialist tradition
question this conclusion, in part because of the worry that forcing government decision makers to treat
the transition losses caused by their decisions as a budget item without doing something similar with
respect to transition gains may cause the former to be overvalued in the political process and thus
inhibit desirable legal change.17  To put the argument slightly differently, some contend that no requiring
government to compensate for harms caused is not necessary to ensure desirable, or prevent
undesirable, legal change.  In addition, some scholars argue that, in any event, government agencies
cannot be expected to “internalize costs” imposed on them by tort-like liability rules in the same way
that firms can, because government officials do not face the same sort of market-driven selection
mechanisms that private managers do.18   
The choice of a transition policy can also affect the political (lobbying) activity of private parties. 
Thus, if there were a Congressional norm of applying all tax-law changes nominally retroactively (which,
again, is not currently the rule), one might expect to see much more intense lobbying against tax-law
changes by those who have a stake in the old law than if there were no such rule.  For that reason, even
a hard-core advocate of retroactivity (and opponent of transition relief) should, if she is a
consequentialist, be willing to compromise on that view and thus, for example, be open to allowing
grandfathering or phase-ins in some situations, in order to increase the likelihood of getting desirable
tax-law changes enacted.  Similarly, even the most committed believer in a reliance-based view of
11
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19 Professor Shaviro has emphasized the importance of the rational expectations to the
transitions debate.  Shaviro, supra note 2, at 19.  
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transitions, if she is a consequentialist, must be prepared to make accommodations to certain political
realities.  For example, even with respect to explicit government contracts (which arguably represents
the strongest case for a reliance-based insistence on government compensation for “transition” losses),
something short of a norm of full compensation for government breaches of contract might be
appropriate if it can be shown that a full-compensation rule tends to induce an excessive amount of
illegitimate interest group involvement in procurement policymaking.   
III. The Rational Expectations Question
A.  The Products Liability Analogy
As mentioned, the consequentialist framework focuses on the effects of alternative transition
policies on the ex ante choices of private decision-makers.  Therefore, a key assumption of the
framework is that those private parties will make rational, unbiased assessments of (a) the likelihood of
legal change, (b) the nature of legal change, and (c) the way in which the legal change will be applied to
them, which will be governed by the so-called transition policy.  If we assume that private decision-
makers will on average make unbiased assessments of these aspects of legal change, we would
conclude that they are exhibiting macroeconomists call “rational expectations.”19  Note that rational
expectations is not an assumption of perfect or costless information on the part of private actors. 
Rather, it is an assumption only of unbiased decision-making.  This assumption, therefore, will not be
satisfied, and hence any incentive-based justification of a particular transition policy will be undermined
(or at least made much more complicated), to the extent that private parties exhibit systematic biases in
12
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20 As will explain below, there is considerable evidence that individual decision-making under
conditions of uncertainty is often biased. 
21 For the majority of this Article, I will ignore the insurance and distributional aspects of the
economic analysis of legal rules and transition policies. 
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their decision-making in one direction or another.20  To see the significance of this point, it will be useful
to explore an analogy that is at the core of the consequentialist model of transitions – the analogy to
products liability law.
But first  it is important to emphasize here that the rational expectations assumption – the
assumption of unbiased decision-making – is essential not only to incentive-based justifications of
alternative transition policies, but also to the normative economic analysis of legal rules generally.21 
According to canonical economic analysis of law, the efficiency of a legal rule depends largely on the ex
ante incentive effects of that rule.  Thus, in designing optimal legal rules, law-and-economics scholars
generally assume, explicitly or implicitly, that private parties affected by the rule in question will on
average correctly assess (a) what the law is, (b) the likelihood that the law will be applied to them, and
(c) how the law will be applied to their situation.  The importance of these assumptions can be
illustrated by examining particular type of liability rule to which transition policies can be and have been
analogized.
Consider, then, the well-known law-and-economics question concerning the choice of the
optimal products liability rule, that is, the rule that achieves optimal product risk deterrence and
insurance.  If we begin with the assumption that consumers and manufacturers exhibit rational
expectations with regard to both the risks of product accidents and the tort liability rules that will be
applied in the event of a product accident, a good incentive-based case can be made for a rule of no
13
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22 This phrase is borrowed from Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. 630 (1999).
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liability, one that leaves the parties to work out issues of risk sharing via contract, such as through
product warranties and disclaimers.  Following this reasoning, it is conventional to conclude that, if both
consumers and manufacturers make unbiased risk assessments and if transactions costs are otherwise
low, the competitive market will produce the optimal level of care and activity on both sides.  Another
way of putting this conclusion is that, assuming rational expectations and low transaction costs, there is
a fairly decent argument that the risks of product accidents are best handled via contract rather than tort
law.    
B. Where Incentive-Based Arguments Run into Trouble: Taking Behavioralism
Seriously22
If, however, we introduce the assumption that consumers tend systematically to underestimate
certain types of low probability risks (such as product accident risks), a no-liability tort rule – one that
defers entirely to contracts between the parties – would lead to both suboptimal care (both by
manufacturers and consumers) and excessive activity levels.   Moreover, if we adopt the assumption of
consumer under-estimation of risk, and if we also assume (critically) that manufacturers do not exhibit a
similar or offsetting bias, a good incentive-based argument can be made for expanding products liability
law and forcing manufacturers – through a rule of enterprise liability or something close to it – to
internalize product accident costs that would otherwise be externalized due to the consumer bias. 
Indeed, it is just this sort of argument that has served as one of the primary theoretical justifications for
the expansion of products liability law over the past several decades, from a regime based in contract,
14
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23 See generally Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case
for Enterprise Liability, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 683, 706-12 (1993); George L. Priest, The Invention of
Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J.
LegalStud. 461, 517 (1985) (both attributing the trend towards enterprise liability in part to the
problem of uninformed consumers); see also Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury, 1 A.L.I. 230
(1991) ("The principle assumption in the literature supporting a role for legal liability is that consumers
underestimate product defect risks and, as a consequence, put insufficient market pressure on firms to
produce safety.").  
24 Kaplow, supra note 2, at 548-59.
25 See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice & Mark E. Roszkowski, "Tort Reform" and the Liability
"Revolution": Defending Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products, 27 Gonz. L. Rev. 251, 291
(1991-1992); and Howard A. Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41
UCLA L. Rev. 1193, 1194-95 (1994).  Note that, according to this argument, product warnings will
not generally solve the problem of consumer over-optimism, and thus cannot serve as an alternative to
strict liability, because the same cognitive quirks that produce under-estimation of product risks will
inhibit accurate assessment of warnings.  See generally, Croley & Hanson, supra note 23.
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to one based in fault, to one that has elements of absolute enterprise liability.23  
This argument, again, depends on two assumptions: an assumption that there is systematic
consumer underestimation of risk and an assumption that there is no systematic bias on the part of
manufacturers.  As to the first assumption, it is now well-known that the rational-actor model of neo-
classical economics is a fiction.  Cognitive psychologists and behavioral researchers have for years
documented through experimental investigation what was before a commonly held intuition: human
beings often do not behave in a manner that is consistent with standard model of homo economicus.24 
Such a conclusion would not necessarily be a problem for policymakers, if the various behavioral
heuristics and biases all lined up in a single direction, or at least in predictable directions.  For example,
if research consistently revealed that consumers generally tend to underestimate all types of product
risks in a certain way, a strong case could be made for adopting a regime of enterprise liability for all
types of product accidents.25  Alternatively, if the research consistently indicated that consumers tend to
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26 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations of
Tort Law, 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 625 (1996).
27 Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury, 1 A.L.I. 223 (1991) ("[T]he degree to which
there is overestimation or underestimation of injury risk varies with the character of the risk and the
particular market context.  Empirical evidence indicates that there are tendencies to both overestimate and
underestimate the risk in different circumstances.").
28 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 22, at  715-18 (1999).
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overestimate all product risks, then strict liability would clearly not be the optimal rule, but would
instead lead to overdeterrence.26  
As it turns out, however, the behavioral research comes to neither of these easy conclusions. 
The best reading of the evidence is that in some situations consumers will likely underestimate risks and
in other situations overestimate them.27  Even this finding would not necessarily be problematic for
policymakers, if the different domains of over- and underestimation of product risks could be clearly
specified.  In such a case, an argument could be made, for example, for having strict liability for some
product risks and not for others.  But the evidence also does not support such a convenient
categorization of product risks, not yet anyway.28  Whether one should expect under- or overestimation
of a given risk in a given context will depend on a range of factors:  whether the risk in question involves
a “very low,” “low,” or “high” probability of occurrence (which would lead to under-, over-, and
under-estimation, respectively); the extent to which the “availability,” “anchoring,” and
“representativeness” heuristics come into play (which can lead to over- or under-estimation, depending
on the situation); the extent to which the individual feels that they have “control” over the probability of
the harm (which pushes toward under-estimation); and the extent of the general “optimism bias” under
which individuals tend to underestimate the likelihood of bad things happening to them personally even if
16
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29 For a thorough summary of the behavioral literature as applied to the products liability
question, see id.
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the correctly assess (or even overestimate) the likelihood for group of which they are a part.29  In sum,
the behavioral evidence leads to inconclusive results for products liability law, and perhaps for other
areas of law as well.  This indeterminacy conclusion, however, does not imply that policy-makers can
ignore the behavioralist evidence and return to the traditional rational actor framework.  That
framework has been severely undermined in this setting.  Rather, what the indeterminacy conclusion
suggests is that the incentive-based approach to evaluating legal rules, including as tort rules, has
profound limitations.
C. How Behavioralism Limits the Incentive-Based Case for Retroactivity
If I am right about that conclusion, a similar point can be made about incentive-based
arguments in the transition context.  Arguments that seek to justify one transition norm over another on
the basis of the relative ex ante incentive effects are significantly limited by the behavioralists’ findings. 
This point can be seen most clearly in the anticipation-based argument in favor of retroactivity.  A
central assumption of that argument is that the parties affected by the law will rationally anticipate
changes in that law, as well as the way in which those changes will be applied to them.  Thus the
anticipation-based argument assumes that, although it may well be that no single person knows the
precise probability of a given law’s being changed in any particular year, the relevant group of
individuals who are affected by the law will on average behave as if they are reasonably informed.  Put
differently, even if they are uninformed, they are randomly uninformed; and their decisions in the
aggregate will tend to cluster around an unbiased estimate of the likelihood of future policy changes and
17
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of how the new law will be applied intertemporally.  Thus, the anticipation-based justification for a
transition policy of retroactivity – of not providing transition relief for transition losses and gains – entails
an assumption that the private parties who will be affected by that transition norm will, on average and
over the long run, rationally take into account that policy and hence the potential uncompensated costs
of legal change, in their ex ante investment decisions.
The behavioralist’s findings cast doubt on this line of reasoning.  It seems likely that the same
cognitive quirks that affect consumers’ assessments of product risks, and of risks more generally, will
affect individuals’ guesses about the likelihood of legal change, the nature of the change, and the way in
which transition costs and benefits will be handled.  Consider, first, an example of a federal tax
provision that is valued by many individual taxpayers, and which could conceivably be repealed:
namely, the home-mortgage interest deduction.  The anticipation-based argument here would say that
we should have a tax transition norm that requires the repeal of the mortgage-interest deduction to be
made fully retroactive and that no relief should be provided for those individuals who bought a home in
reliance on that deduction.  The idea again is to induce taxpayers to internalize the possibility of such a
repeal.  But for the argument to work, it must be shown that individual taxpayers (specifically
homeowners) will on average correctly estimate, among other things, the likelihood of the interest
deduction’s repeal.   But depending upon whether this possibility is considered by taxpayers to be a
very low probability, a low probability, or a high probability event, there may be systematic bias in
either the over- or underestimation direction.  What’s more, the perceived likelihood of repeal would
likely fluctuate over time in a way that makes useful generalizations impossible.  For example, the repeal
of the mortgage-interest deduction, as of this writing, seems a remote possibility, as the attention of
18
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Congress and the President are on other matters.  If I am right about that, then most individuals
probably just ignore this risk completely, or regard it as having zero probability.  However, on some
future date, if the national policy agenda were to change such that serious tax reform were back in the
news, the probability of such a repeal might be perceived merely as “low” and hence overestimated. 
Similarly, if some other tax provision were to be repealed, increasing the salience factor, there might be
a temporary boost in the probability estimate of the interest deduction’s repeal.  
A similar story could be told about other types of transitions that have received considerable
attention in the literature.  Consider, for example, the government’s decision to take an individual’s
property for use in building a highway.  The anticipation-based consequentialist argument for a policy of
no compensation assumes that individual property owners can be expected to engage in a rational,
unbiased cost-benefit analysis of the prospects of their property’s being taken by the government. 
Under that assumption, the argument goes, a regime that promises compensation would induce
property owners to engage in various types of moral hazard, such as building in anticipation of the
taking, which would increase the social cost of the transition.  The risk of a taking, however, is enough
like other types of risks that the behavioralist insight begs to be applied:  For example, into which
category would a taking fall?  Would it be very low probability, or just low probability, or maybe even
high probability?  Obviously, again, it would depend on the situation.  Some takings are extremely low
probability events.  In those cases, one can easily imagine the property owners – especially if they
happen to be homeowners – systematically underestimating the risk.  If that were so, a policy of
providing government compensation in such cases would not necessarily create bad incentives, and
19
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30 Kaplow, supra note 2, at n.116.
31 A significant percentage of homeowners in California and in Florida do not purchase
earthquake and hurricane insurance, respectively, even though FEMA grants pay only a relatively small
fraction of the cost of damaged homes.  Even in flood zones, where federal lenders are required by law
to insist on a proof of flood insurance before issuing a mortgage loan, a substantial percentage of new
homes in those areas do not carry flood insurance.  See generally http://www.fema.gov/nfip/intnfip.htm;
see also Edward T. Pasterick, The National Flood Insurance Program, in Paying the Price: the Status
and Role of Insurance Against natural Disasters in the United States 125 (1998).
32 Kaplow, supra note 2, at 549-50.  It may be that the homeowners who build in disaster-
prone areas and do not buy private insurance wrongly believe that ex post federal disaster relief is more
fully compensatory than it is.  If that is the explanation of the uninsured building in disaster areas, then it
provides evidence that a promise of government compensation in takings situations might also have
inefficient incentive effects.
33 As I argue below, I generally have more confidence in the rational expectations of business
decision makers, who face competitive pressures, than in the rational expectations of individual
consumer decisions.  Thus, putting a takings-insurer on the hook for the loss rather than an individual
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might provide an reasonably effective form of takings insurance.30  
Indeed, there is some evidence that individual homeowners do behave this way.  For example,
many individual homeowners continue to build new houses in disaster-prone areas, even though many
of them do not have insurance for disaster losses and even though the government-provided ex post
compensation – in the form of FEMA grants and SBA loans – for such losses is minimal.31  If this
phenomenon is attributable to the underestimation of disaster risk (whether from the optimism bias or
some other cognitive phenomena), a potential solution to the moral hazard problem would be
compulsory disaster insurance.32  Obviously, if disaster insurance – or, for that matter, takings insurance
– were made compulsory, ex post government compensation would not be necessary; compensation
would come from the insurer.  Likewise, if there were compulsory takings insurance, it would be the
insurer who would have an incentive to anticipate the government’s takings decisions.33
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may provide incentive benefits.  Insurers, however, would have to be allowed to charge premiums that
were roughly actuarially fair.  The key difficulty would enforcement.  People may be tempted to build
without the requisite insurance, despite the threat of an uncompensated taking, just as they often build
now on flood plains even when they have no flood insurance or the hope of full ex post flood relief. 
Presumably, building permits could be made conditional on getting takings (and disaster) insurance, but
that approach would put a great deal of pressure, financial and political, on the licensing authorities.
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On the other hand, anecdotal evidence suggests that, in some situations, the possibility of
compensated takings can have serious moral hazard effects.  This is especially true as the probability of
the taking increases, perhaps because as that probability increases (and perhaps moves into the “low
probability” range), the problem of underestimation may disappear and might be replaced by the
problem of overestimation, which could in turn lead to inefficient overbuilding, again assuming a regime
in which takings are compensated by the government.  Or maybe not.  The difficulty presented by all of
these possibilities, of course, is that we cannot predict in advance which types of takings will be
affected by which bias in which direction, nor can the various biases be expected to offset each other in
any systematic way or be eliminated by experience.  Depending, then, on how all of these and other
behavioral phenomena interact at any given time, individual taxpayers and homeowners on average may
over- or underestimate the likelihood of the provision’s repeal, and of receiving transition relief.  Thus,
the case for adopting a transition norm (or transition “liability rule”) that requires individuals to rationally
anticipate law change is relatively weak.    
C. Where Incentive-Based Arguments Work: Deterrable Manufacturers/Deterrable
Taxpayers
The next question is whether the conclusion of the previous section implies that incentive-based
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34 For an argument that draws on the work of behavioralist researchers to argue that debiasing
consumers with respect to product risks may be very difficult to achieve, see Hanson & Kysar, supra
note 22.
35 Kaplow made a similar observation in his original transition article.  Kaplow, supra note 2, at
549 (“As a rough approximation, one might expect that institutional investors and corporations are in
rather good positions to make such probability estimates. In contrast, less sophisticated (often, less
wealthy) individual investors may lack sufficient incentives to collect the information to make good
estimates and are thus more likely to be subject to systematic cognitive biases that would lead to poor risk
assessments.”) A similar point has been made by some behavioral law-and-economics scholars.  See,
e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1525 (1988) (“We think that defendant overoptimism is likely to be a much
smaller factor for firms than for individual defendants, since firms that make systematic errors in
judgment will be at a competitive disadvantage.”). 
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arguments can never be used to justify one transition policy over another.  That may be the appropriate
conclusion.  In other words, until we have a better understanding of how individuals actually make
decisions under conditions of uncertainty, perhaps consequentialist scholars and policy-makers
considering the choice of an optimal transition policy – or an optimal products liability rule for that
matter – should focus on issues other than the effect of those policies or rules on individuals’ incentives. 
Most legal scholars, however, presumably would not go that far.  This is because either most scholars
hold the view that individuals (including consumers and taxpayers) can learn or be educated over time
to act rationally (that is, they can be “debiased”34) or they hold the view that incentive-based arguments
still have considerable force when applied to corporate or business decision-makers rather than
individuals.  It is the latter argument that I want to focus on in the remainder of this Part.
There are reasons to believe that over the long run the decisions of corporate managers and of
business decision-makers generally tend to be rational; that is, they tend not to be subject to the same
biases that plague individuals acting in their capacities as consumers, at least not to the same degree.35 
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Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. Pa. L. Rev.
101, 140-41 (1997) (reviewing psychological and management studies finding that some business
cultures tend to promote overconfidence among executives).
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This assertion will be either controversial or obvious, depending on one’s perspective.  On the one
hand, corporate managers are people too, and they are doubtless subject to the same cognitive biases
as the rest of us.  Indeed, there may be reasons to believe that successful corporations tend to attract
leaders who are relatively optimistic in their outlook; moreover, successful corporations may tend to be
characterized by cultures that foster such systematic optimism.36  
On the other hand, notwithstanding the recent findings of behavioralist researchers, few readers
would dispute that businesses in general seek to maximize profits and that successful businesses, if
operating within reasonably competitive markets, tend to equalize marginal cost and marginal revenue. 
And if a business diverges too far from that maxim, it will tend to be competed out of business.  As a
result, so long as companies are allowed to fail, and so long as labor and capital are allowed (and are
able) to migrate relatively freely (even if not costlessly) across and within various types of businesses
and industries, market competition will provide a selection mechanism that will tend to weed out
companies that routinely or systematically underestimate products risks or legal risk more generally over
the long term.  This is not to say that corporate decision making cannot be shortsighted or overly
optimistic or too narrowly focused or just plain stupid.  Corporate decision-making is notoriously
subject to agency problems owing to the separation of ownership and control, and such agency
problems obviously do not afflict individual decision-making.  Nevertheless, businesses whose
managers systematically under- or over-estimate risks will tend to be less successful and less long-lived
23
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involving product safety or environmental regulation, can be found in other descriptions of the new-view
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than firms that find ways to minimize such problems.  If we take this conclusion seriously, as most
scholars and policy makers (and certainly most citizens) do, some of the force is returned to incentive-
based arguments.
In any event, the strongest case for the rational expectations assumption involves corporate or
commercially sophisticated business decision-makers.  This conclusion is of central importance to what
I regard as the two most rhetorically powerful examples illustrating the consequentialist incentive-based
case for a norm of retroactivity.  The first, which deals with evolving tort standards or product safety
regulation more generally, is probably the most often-cited and most compelling example of the new-
view’s anticipation-oriented approach to retroactivity.  The second example, which deals with a
particular type of tax-law change, is, in my view, an equally convincing illustration of when a strong
retroactivity norm can be desirable.  In the following discussion of these two examples, the point is to
focus on the rational expectations assumption.  As a result, the discussion in this Part assumes that the
legal changes in question are desirable, that they represent legal progress the anticipation of which by
the relevant parties would unambiguously increase social welfare.  Part IV below examines the question
under what circumstances that assumption would plausible for these two cases.
D. Two Strong Cases for Retroactivity: Evolving Tort Law and Closing Tax
Loopholes
 
1.  The Products Liability Example: Rational Manufacturers
The first example derives from Louis Kaplow’s 1986 article, although versions of the example
appear in the work of a number of consequentialist transition scholars.37  The legal change at issue is the
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case for a retroactivity norm.  See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 12, at 1661-62 (emphasizing incentive
benefits of retroactive product ban in situation in which product is originally declared safe but then
subsequently found to cause harm); Shaviro, supra note 2, at 48 (the same).  I develop more detailed
version of this tort/regulatory example below.
38 Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post
Incentive-Based Regulation, 98 Yale L. J. 1163, 1301-06 (1998) (making this point in support of
holding tobacco companies retroactively liable for the harms caused by cigarettes).
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expansion or reinterpretation of products liability law that results in a product manufacturer’s being held
liable for the first time for the harm caused by its product.  The question is whether and to what extent
this new extension of tort law should be applied to a manufacturer that made fixed investments in the
infrastructure necessary to make and distribute the product, before the new rule was announced.  If
the court decides to apply its decision retroactively, and thereby creates a binding or at least influential
precedent, the resulting transition norm would have the benefit of giving other manufacturers an
incentive to anticipate such expansions of tort law in the future.38  Thus, a transition norm of
uncompensated legal change – which, again, is the generally prevailing norm in products liability cases –
gives manufacturers an incentive to anticipate desirable change in products liability law.
Part of what makes this example compelling is that one can easily imagine product
manufacturers in fact responding to the adoption of a retroactivity transition norm in just this way,
precisely because of the effects of competitive market forces on corporate rationality.  Companies that
fail to anticipate such legal change, given the retroactivity norm, will be out-competed by firms that do. 
Of course, the presence of such a retroactivity norm also increases the manufacturer’s incentives to
take political action to prevent courts from being able to expand tort law in this way.  For example,
because the transition norm here entails retroactivity, product manufacturer trade groups are likely to
25
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spend more money on “tort reform” legislation that would protect them against expansions in tort law
than if the norm were prospectivity.  But that phenomenon will always be present and implies only that
the overall optimal transition policy may be something less than full retroactivity.  The point here is that
the retroactivity norm in tort law is especially likely to have the desired incentive effect in the case of
products liability law, when the reasonable expectations assumption seems plausible, even compelling. 
2.  The Tax Law Example: Hyper-Rational Taxpayers
Now consider an equally compelling example, this time from tax law.  I have already expressed
skepticism about the applicability of the rational expectations assumption to tax-law changes involving
individuals’ tax returns, at least for the average individual taxpayer.  The repeal of the home-mortgage
interest deduction is such an example.  In this section, however, I want to focus on a class of examples
involving more commercially sophisticated taxpayers, examples that present, in my view, perhaps the
strongest case for the rational expectations assumption in any legal setting.  These examples involve
various forms of tax shelters, and the taxpayers in question are either corporations who have in-house
and/or outside tax counsel or individuals who are sufficiently wealthy to hire sophisticated tax advisors.  
The term tax shelter is use loosely here.  To label a particular transaction as a tax shelter is to
imply the conclusion that Congress could not reasonably have intended the transaction to receive the
tax treatment that the taxpayer asserts for it.  That conclusion is true enough, but not very informative. 
Another possible way of describing tax shelters would be those transactions that are entered into purely
for tax reasons.  But that definition is obviously over-inclusive.  Congress often enacts provisions that
are clearly intended (or at least understood) to affect taxpayers’ incentives.  Indeed, that is the whole
point of such provisions.  Examples of these include the tax exemption for state and local bonds and
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39 I am assuming that reduction of the corporate or individual tax base generally is not a
“plausible policy justification.”
40 David Weisbach makes the social argues that it is not just tax shelters which produce social
waste but all “tax planning.”  David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths about Tax Shelters, 55 Tax L. Rev. 215,
223 (2002). 
41 Janet Nobak and Laura Sanders, The Hustling of X-Rated Shelters, Forbes December 14,
1998. 
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accelerated depreciation; and for these provisions, there is at least a plausible policy justification that
can be offered, whether it be to subsidize state and local governments or to subsidize certain sorts of
investments in business property.  Perhaps a better definition of a tax shelter, then, would be a tax-
motivated transaction that relies on a nonobvious (or, in some cases, implausible) interpretation of the
Internal Revenue Code that is highly beneficial to the taxpayer (in terms of lowering their taxes) and that
has no plausible policy justification.39  
Tax shelter activity, defined this way, can be thought of as being entirely wasteful, as creating a
sort of negative externality for society.40  And the analogy to products liability law thus can usefully be
applied here as well.  Indeed, in recent years the tax departments in most corporations have begun to
understand themselves as “profit centers.”41  What this means is that the tax managers or inside tax
counsels of these firms are expected to come up with new “products” designed to help the company
make money.  In this case the products in question are new tax shelters.  Because of competitive
pressures, these tax managers will shop for the most creative and aggressive tax-shelter products
available.  Also part of this hyper-competitive dynamic are the shelter “promoters,” the law firms,
accounting firms, or investment banks who employ exceptionally bright and hardworking tax experts
who, among other things, scour the Internal Revenue Code and the regulations for ambiguities or
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42 For an excellent recent symposium on the phenomenon of tax shelters and the appropriate
responses to them, see Symposium on Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 Tax. L. Rev., Issues 2 & 3 (2002).
43 The general rule is that new Treasury Regulations cannot be applied to tax years ending
before the date that notice of the regulation is publicly released.  IRC § 7805(b)(1).  That is, Treasury
Regulations must generally be applied nominally prospectively and cannot be applied nominally
retroactively.  See supra note 2 for a discussion of this distinction.  Note that, prior to 1996, under the
old 7805, the Treasury Department had more discretion to apply regulations retroactively, and that rule
was changed in 1996 as part of the “Taxpayer Bill of Rights.”  For a discussion of what led up to this
change, see Shaviro, supra note 2, at 115-17.  Under the new prohibition against nominally retroactive
Treasury Regulations, there are exceptions.  Regulations issued within 18 months of the enactment of
the rule to which the regulations relate can be nominally retroactive. Section 7805(b)(2).  In addition, if
necessary “to prevent abuse,” Treasury Regulations can be applied nominally retroactively.  Section
7805(b)(3).  
44 Notice 98-5, 1998-1, C.B. 334 (notice of Treasury Department’s intention to issue
regulations shutting down abusive tax-motivated use of foreign tax credits, which regulations would be
applied retroactively only to date of notice).
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inconsistencies that, when exploited creatively can produce millions in tax savings.42  
Part of what seems to fuel the market for tax shelters, or at least what allows this market to
thrive, is the largely prospective nature of tax enforcement.  Under current practice, if the Treasury
Department or Congress finds a tax loophole and closes it, they typically do so nominally prospectively
from the date of the new regulation or the new corrective legislation.43  Sometimes those decisions are
made retroactive to some earlier date, for example, the date on which the IRS issued a notice indicating
the Service’s interpretation of the provision and Treasury’s intent to issue clarifying regulations.44   But
that is typically as far back as the repeal will reach.  Of course, if a particular shelter gets challenged by
the IRS as lacking economic substance or a substantial business purpose, and the taxpayer ends up
losing the case in court, such decisions, like most court decisions, are in fact applied nominally
retroactively.  Many tax shelter transactions, however, never reach that point, largely because of the
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45 See id.
46 One prominent New York tax lawyer made the following observation regarding the general
effect of the prospective application of tax regulations:  “Taxpayers today ... have little concern about
the risk fo retroactive regulations.  They assume that any notice stopping a transaction will announce
regulations that will only apply to subsequent transactions.”  Michael Schler, Ten More Truths About
Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 Tax L. Rev.
325, 370 (2002).
47 Because not every shelter will be caught, some element of punitive damages or penalties may
be necessary, just as in tort cases.  For an argument that tax shelter deterrence could be largely
achieved without radical changes in current deterrence policy through the use of blacklists for prohibited
shelters and through enforcement against shelter promoters, see Mark P. Gergen, The Logic of
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audit lottery or because, even on audit, the IRS may miss the issue; or the court may apply a weak
version of the economic substance doctrine.  
An important transition question, then, is whether and to what extent the Treasury Department
(and, when necessary, Congress itself) should apply its interpretations of the Code nominally
retroactively.   Under the current general rule of nominally prospective Treasury Regulations (which can
be retroactive only to the year of first public notice),45 the effect may be to increase the demand for
shelters, rather than to deter their creation.46  In a sense, then, current tax enforcement practices,
because of the prospectivity norm with respect to legislation and the prospectivity rule with respect to
new regulations, serve as a sort of planned obsolescence for tax shelters, artificially creating a need for
the newest model.  Moreover, according to at least one major tax-shelter promoter, the supply will be
able to keep up with demand, as promoters continue to mass-produce tax shelter ideas that can then be
marketed to specific clients.
In these circumstances, a norm of retroactive tax liability if applied vigorously would create
some serious deterrence.47  The analogy to the products liability context is, again, obvious.  Just as
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Deterrence: Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 Tax L. Rev. 255 (2002).  I generally like the idea of
blacklisting certain prohibited shelters and of going after both taxpayers (the sophisticated ones) and
promoters.  See infra discussion in the text immediately below.  My main point is that there is a very
good case – both on rational expectations and legal progress grounds – that such efforts should be
made nominally retroactive.  I will return to the legal progress piece of this argument in Part IV below.
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product manufacturers are likely to take into account the threat of products liability lawsuits in designing
and manufacturing their products and hence internalize the full social cost that their products cause, so
too would corporate taxpayers begin to internalize the costs of their aggressive tax planning, if they
were to face a more broadly applicable transition rule of nominal retroactivity.  Indeed, my main point
here is to emphasize the extreme, almost hyper-, rationality exhibited by sophisticated taxpayers and
their tax advisors not only with respect to what the existing tax laws are, but also with respect to how
those laws are likely to be changed.  
To take the products liability analogy one step further, we might imagine a system of joint and
several liability, which would put shelter promoters on the hook along with taxpayers for the potential
retroactive tax deficiency.  On the other hand, joint and several liability might not be necessary.  If
retroactivity were adopted and applied only to the taxpayers themselves, the demand for tax advice
might respond in interesting ways.  For example, with a serious threat of nominally retroactive repeal,
sophisticated taxpayers may put pressure on their tax advisors or on the shelter promoters or both to
put their money where their mouth is.  The taxpayers might go so far as to demand that the advisors
bond their opinions by, in effect, providing retroactive tax insurance.  The lawyers and accountants
might in turn either self-insure this risk (if they have the courage of their convictions) or alternatively shift
some of it to their malpractice carriers, who would, in turn, hire their own in-house tax lawyers to assist
in the underwriting process.  And so on.  This infinite regress of lawyers, insurers, and more lawyers
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would mirror what we see in the tort context, where efficient deterrence has long been assumed to
involve the threat of at least some degree of retroactive liability, the risk of which is shared with one’s
liability insurance carrier, who then has an incentive to keep an eye on the insured.  Something similar
could arise with respect to retroactive tax risk.    
In addition to corporate taxpayers, the retroactivity rule might also be profitably applied to
individual taxpayers who seek to benefit from various cockamamie interpretations of the Code being
pushed by tax promoters.  For example, many wealthy individuals, desperate to avoid estate and gift
tax liability, will sign on to very aggressive interpretations of the trust provisions or life insurance
provisions in the Code if those interpretations are endorsed by an accountant, lawyer, or shelter
promoter.  In those cases too, the use of sophisticated tax counsel will increase the deterrence benefit
of the retroactivity norm, and the adoption of such a norm might lead individual tax-shelter promoters
also to insure their advice.    
In sum, a transition norm of nominal retroactivity with respect to the elimination of tax shelters
likely would have the desired deterrent effect, precisely because of the rationality of such taxpayers. 
Part of the reason I suspect that a retroactivity norm would provide some useful deterrence in the tax
shelter context is that, when the suggestion is made to apply tax-shelter repeals nominally retroactive,
tax practitioners become apoplectic.  This strong reaction to the retroactivity idea suggests, of course,
that if such a transition policy were adopted, the affected taxpayers would suddenly have a new
incentive to work extra hard to lobby Congress and, to the extent possible, the Treasury Department to
avoid having their transactions characterized as illegitimate shelters in the first place.  Thus, public-
choice theory reminds us that some concession may have to be made to the political reality, lest we
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49 Levmore, supra note 12, at 1658 (“The suggestion [of new view scholars] is that transition
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50 Shaviro, supra note 2, 48-49.
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substantially reduce the likelihood of good law changes occurring.  As usual, this public-choice
argument is difficult to respond to.  For those of us who are relative optimists about the Treasury
department’s independence from lobbying taxpayers, however, the possibility of nominally retroactive
shelter repeals seems worth trying.
  
IV.  The Legal Progress Question
Under the consequentialist framework, with respect to some types of legal change, one of the
essential and explicit assumptions has to do with whether the change in question is good or bad.  For
example, the incentive-based argument in favor of retroactivity in tort law and tax law explicitly assumes
that the legal change in those areas is desirable.48   The consequentialist approach, recall, is an
anticipation-based argument; it depends specifically on the claim that, if private parties expect law
change to be applied retroactively, they will have an ex ante incentive to make investments in
anticipation of this change.49  For a large class of legal changes (which, again, seem to fall heavily in the
tort, tax, and regulatory areas), such anticipatory moves on the part of private actors will be desirable if
and only if the law change in question is itself expected to be desirable – that is, only if legal progress is
assumed for that type of law change.50  Symmetrically, if such laws are expected to move in an
undesirable direction, it makes sense under this framework to adopt a transition policy that discourages
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anticipatory investments.51  For these types of law change, a legal progress assumption would support
retroactivity (or no transition relief), and a legal regress assumption would support the opposite.   
According to the consequentialist framework, however, the legal-progress assumption is not a
necessary part of the incentive-based, anticipation-oriented argument favoring retroactivity (and
disfavoring transition relief) in every context of legal change.  Thus, an important question that
consequentialists must answer is when does legal progress matter and when not?  Once that is
answered, a set of equally critical, and perhaps unanswerable, follow-up questions arise: Can we
identify situations in which we can expect law to make distinct, identifiable, long-term progress over
time?  Can we identify situations in which law should be expected not to make progress, where the law
is expected instead to cycle back and forth between various policies either based on alternative and
mutually exclusive visions of the good or, less optimistically, based on shifting coalitions among interest
groups?  If we identify situations in the latter category, what can transition policy do, if anything, about
it?  This Part will offer some tentative thoughts on these questions.  A more complete set of answers will
have to await another day.
A. When Legal Progress Does Not Matter: Destructive Transitions and Other Legal
Disasters
For the anticipation-based pro-retroactivity argument, when does the legal progress or regress
assumption matter?  As it turns out, the assumption seems to matter most in areas such as taxation, tort
law, or regulatory law more generally; situations in which the new law or policy or regulation imposes
some burden on the parties who relied on the prior law, but not so much of a burden as to destroy
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their property entirely or to reduce the value of their pre-transition investment in a way that
could not be reversed by a reversal of the legal change in question.52  This last qualification is
essential, and the best way to understand is to consider an example of a situation in which the legal
progress assumption does not matter.  
The example that is emphasized in the literature is a particular type of government taking of
private property, one that involves the destruction or demolition of improvements, for example,
buildings to make room for some public project.  Here again, it is the ex ante incentive effects that
matter.  Consider the case of an individual who is thinking of constructing a house on a site where, the
individual happens to know, the government may at some point in the future to build a highway.  If the
highway is built, the question is whether the individual should be compensated for the value of the
building, which must be destroyed to make room for the highway.  To ensure that the individual has the
right ex ante incentives (that is, to force her to internalize the cost of her decision to build on this site),
the consequentialist framework would say no to the compensation question, assuming away for now the
behavioralist critique of the rational expectations assumption from the previous Part.  And this answer
would apply even if the government’s decision to build the road were a bad idea.53  That is, society
would want the individual to take into account the possibility that the government may (mistakenly or
foolishly) destroy the building.  In such a case, the government’s decision to destroy the building can be
thought of as being analogous to a natural disaster; and government-provided no-strings-attached
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compensation for natural disasters is generally undesirable from an incentives/deterrence perspective.54 
Thus, we want a property owner to anticipate a government taking that involves the destruction of
property, even if the taking in question turns out to be bad policy.
A similar conclusion would apply to any transition that in effect destroys property value, that
renders property worthless or substantially reduces its value under circumstances in which that value
cannot easily be restored, at least not without incurring substantial new costs to do so.  Various types of
aggressive public regulation might fit within this idea of transition.  For example, consider a product ban
that permanently renders useless some significant asset of a product manufacturer.55  More specifically,
imagine that a manufacturer, Acme, invests a large sum of money to build a new plant for making a
particular product, widgets, say, and imagine further that the plant (including the building and machinery
within) are highly specialized and could not be converted to an alternative use except at enormous
expense.  Now consider the effect if, six weeks after the new widget plant opens, widgets are
permanently banned by a federal agency because of the harm caused by widgets to individual users or
to the environment, and, importantly, assume that the ban is applied to Acme.  The value of the facility
would fall substantially, perhaps by something close to the amount of the cost of retrofitting the plant
and equipment.  
The transition question, then, is whether, after the ban is adopted, compensation should be paid
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up the possibility of other forms of transition relief.
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to Acme for the loss of its investment in the plant and equipment.56  Assuming Acme and companies
like it have something approaching rational expectations, the answer to the transition question is
probably no.  And what is important for current purposes, this answer probably does not depend on
whether the product ban was in fact a good idea.  Irrespective of the wisdom of the product ban, it
would be socially desirable for the manufacturer to take the possibility of such a legal disaster into
account in deciding whether to go into the widget business and how much to invest in making widgets
safe for individuals and for the environment.  This conclusion assumes that there is no prospect that the
ban on widgets might be lifted in time for the manufacturer to resume production and recover the value
of its investment.  Rather, it assumes that the ban will be in force long enough to force the manufacturer
to sell the property at a loss, abandon it, or incur significant additional costs to retool the plant for
another purpose.  It is in this sense that such a regulatory change, as with the destructive taking, have
the quality of a disaster loss.
Put this way, we can also imagine a similar result from an extreme tort suit, or even from a new
confiscatory tax.  All that must be assumed in those cases is that the decline in value resulting from the
new law be substantial and largely irreversible, so that the only plausible form of compensation would
be direct compensation.  The general lesson is that, when private parties anticipate such destructive
transitions, some social gain will be produced, irrespective of the desirability of the transition itself.
There is an alternative version of this example in which the legal progress question may in fact
matter.  What if Acme, when widgets were banned, simply ceased production and moth-balled the
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plant, hoping that the ban would be repealed.  Now assume that the ban was repealed and that this
repeal was optimal, because the original ban was a mistake.  Then the question whether to compensate
Acme for the period of nonuse (or for the decline in value) of its widget plant would turn on whether we
thought Acme had bet correctly on the long run future of widget regulation.  Thus, if Acme had bet
correctly that the initial ban was wrong-headed and would shortly be reversed in favor of the previous
and socially optimal non-ban, it would be a good idea to compensate Acme ex post for that loss of
value.  That way future Acmes would be encouraged not to destroy or convert their plants and
equipment in situations in which the ban is likely to be reversed.57  Depending on how broadly one
reads this exception, it is possible that the importance of the legal progress assumption to transition
questions is significantly larger, and hence that the destructive-transition example is less significant, than
was previously thought.58
B.  When Legal Progress Matters:  Of (Non-Destructive) Torts and Taxes
Now let us return to the tort, tax, and regulatory transitions for which the legal progress
assumption is uncontroversially essential.  For these types of transitions, the anticipation-inducing effects
of a retroactivity norm will be desirable if and only if the transition itself is desirable.59  And if the
transition is undesirable, the optimal transition policy, from a consequentialist perspective, would be a
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norm that actually discourages anticipation of the law change and encourages reliance on old law, such
as a norm of  “full prospectivity” (including “grandfather” treatment).  
1. The Products Liability Example
To illustrate this point, consider a more elaborate version of the classic tort-transitions example
from the previous section. Suppose, again, that Acme makes widgets, which is a type of consumer product
that is used in millions of homes.  For many years widgets have been made, sold, and used by consumers
without incident, except for the occasional injury caused by an obvious misuse or by a production defect. 
More recently, however, there is mounting scientific (epidemiological or engineering) evidence suggesting
that widgets have a design flaw that causes serious harm to consumers, harm that is not manifest until
several years after the initial purchase.  Based on the new studies, all of which confirm the plaintiffs’
causation theory, a court has now decided to hold Acme liable for this harm.  Assume that the liability
rule in question, which does not change in this version of the story, is something like strict liability with
no defense of contributory (call it, enterprise liability), which the courts (or the legislature) originally
adopted because of their belief in the cost-internalizing deterrence benefits of such a rule.  The only
change that has occurred, then, is the court’s decision to accept the new scientific evidence of causation.  
Now the question is what transition rule should apply.  Acme could be held liable for all harms
caused by its widgets, including those produced before the new rule was announced.60  That approach,
which might be called nominal retroactivity, is the prevailing transition norm in tort cases as well as in
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applying common law decision retroactively stems from the pre-realist traditional understanding of the
role of common law courts as finding or interpreting the law rather than making it. 
62 This statement assumes that statutes of limitations are not negotiable.  If they are, then there is
almost no limit to how far back the law could, in theory, reach, though in practice there would be
obvious limits.  From a plaintiff’s perspective, dead people and bankrupt corporations are not attractive
tort defendants.
63 See sources cited supra note 2.  If such a transition norm were the rule, of course, it would
also eliminate a plaintiff’s incentive to bring the case in the first place.  We can put that issue to one side
for the current analysis, given that the problem could be addressed either by making an exception for
the first plaintiff or by reformulating the example as a government lawsuit or a pigouvian tax.  Or we
could allow recovery in this case (to encourage suit), but limit recovery in other suits to future widget
production.
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most other types of court decisions.61  Nominal retroactivity gives the new rule its maximal retroactive
effect; it reaches back as far as rules can reach.62  Alternatively, Acme’s liability could be limited to
future production of widgets, including those produced from plants that were built  before the new rule
was announced.  That would amount to nominal prospectivity (to use Graetz’s term), and it would
obviously entail some retroactive effect as well; that is, under such a transition rule, the court’s decision
of liability would produce a decline in value of Acme’s investment in the old widget plants.63  Finally, to
take the most extreme case, there is the full prospectivity or grandfathering approach.  Under that
transition rule, the new, more expansive interpretation of tort law would apply only to widgets produced
from widget plants constructed (or substantially begun) after the announcement date would face liability. 
This approach would essentially give Acme (and all other current manufacturers of widgets) a pass for
all harms arising from past and future widget production from widget manufacturing plants that were in
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64 If widgets were proven to represent profound health risks, a more likely form of transition
relief would be to ban the product but then to compensate Acme for the cost of its lost investment. 
That would be roughly analogous to fully prospective tort liability, although the latter would actually be
better than fully compensatory, as all pre-existing widget manufacturers would have a unique cost
advantage over their competitors. 
65 This observation is analogous to the one made by Graetz regarding the effect of
grandfathering the repeal of the exemption from federal income taxes of income from state and
municipal bonds.  The holders of the bonds that were tax exempt at the time of the repeal would
receive a windfall gain.  Graetz, supra note 2, at 82 (“Grandfathering a change which is motivated by a
desire to increase the tax burden on the class of persons who have enjoyed a tax incentive is much like
passing a law to redistribute wealth and requiring compensation to those from whom wealth was
distributed. Grandfathering such changes produces windfall gains to the class of persons presumably
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operation (or perhaps under construction) at the time of the decision.64 
To see the incentive or deterrence benefits of retroactivity in this example, compare the effects
on Acme’s incentives of the nominal retroactivity and full prospectivity alternatives, which are the two
opposites on the transition continuum.  If nominal retroactivity had been the transition norm, and Acme
had known this to be so (i.e., if Acme had had rational expectations with respect to that issue), then
when Acme first became aware of the mounting scientific evidence confirming the harmfulness of
widgets, the company might have decided not to build its most recent widget plant, or it might have
decided to implement additional socially-cost-justified safety improvements that would have
dramatically reduced the risk of injury.  If, by contrast, the norm had been (and Acme had rationally
anticipated) grandfather treatment, even if Acme became aware of the new scientific studies, there
would have been no tort-driven incentive for them to take into account the harm caused by their
product.  In addition, they would have received a windfall gain from the transition, since only their
widget plants – and perhaps others that had been operating before the transition – would be allowed to
continue operating under the old, lower cost regime.65  In short, nominal retroactivity would have made
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Acme internalize the externality it was producing; however, a grandfathered transition rule would force
new producers only to internalize the externality caused by widgets, but not existing producers; and a
nominally prospective rule would internalize some to the old companies and some to the new. 
The choice of the optimal transition rule, at least on incentive grounds, seems obvious.  Given
the assumptions of the example, nominal retroactivity – which again is the prevailing norm for common
law decisions – provides the most efficient level of deterrence, because it creates the maximum
incentive for Acme and other manufacturers to anticipate desirable rule changes.  The rhetorical power
of this example, however, lies in the plausibility of its assumptions.  Specifically, note how the
desirability of the retroactivity norm in this example depends on the assumption of legal progress.  This
can be seen by observing how our intuitions change if we imagine that the courts are just as likely to
accept bad scientific evidence as good.  In that case, it can be argued that society is made worse off by
inducing anticipation of the latest scientific findings.  Likewise, if we thought that enterprise liability were
not the efficient liability rule in the first place, that such a rule inhibits efficient product innovation and
results in underproduction of socially desirable products and services, or if even our policy makers and
citizens were divided on these questions, then anticipatory investments in expectation of the next
application of that rule would not necessarily be a good thing.  In both of those cases, society might be
better off with a transition norm that called for new applications of enterprise liability to be nominally
prospective only.  In any event, the incentive-based case in favor of retroactivity evaporates.66  Again,
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important settings.  This reasoning does not necessarily lead to the opposite conclusion – that the
optimal incentives will be created by the opposite of retroactivity. 
67 Graetz, supra note 2.
68 Id. at 49.
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the same point could be applied to various non-tort forms of regulation as well.
2. The Tax Example
We can also tell a similar story using a tax example, one that nicely illustrates both the best case
for tax-transition retroactivity and the importance of the legal progress assumption.  The standard
example in the literature for illustrating the incentive benefits of a retroactivity norm in the tax context,
which comes from Graetz’s 1977 article, involves the repeal of the federal income tax exemption for
state and municipal bonds.67  To highlight the centrality of the legal progress assumption, assume that
the reason for the repeal is this: A steady stream of economic studies have begun to reveal that the
bond exemption has over the years produced a substantial degree of allocative inefficiency by distorting
the investment choices of individual investors.  As a result of these studies, Congress has now decided
to eliminate the provision. The question then becomes how to apply the new tax law – the repeal of the
provision – intertemporally.  Among the possible transition rules, again, are nominal prospectivity, full
prospectivity (with grandfathering), and nominal retroactivity.  A nominally prospective repeal would
apply only to future tax years, but would apply to the income earned from bonds purchased prior to the
rule change.  Interest on those pre-transition bonds, in other words, would not exclude interest.  As
Graetz pointed out, such a nominally prospective change can nevertheless have a substantial retroactive
effect on the value of the bonds.68  By contrast, full prospectivity, which would include a grandfather
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there is a sense in which even this conception of nominal retroactivity is not full retroactivity.
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rule, would come close to full compensation for the transition loss.  And finally, nominal retroactivity,
which is rare in the tax context, would presumably apply not only to future tax years but to prior,
unclosed tax years as well.69  In Graetz’s example, the repeal is ungrandfathered but made nominally
prospective; and the question is whether grandfathering would produce a better outcome.
The answer, according to the consequentialist argument, is no, again assuming rationale
expectations and desirable legal change.  If the repeal is a good idea, as we have assumed, then the
more retroactive the transition rule (the farther back into the past the new rule reaches), the better.  This
is because the more retroactive the repeal is expected to be, the more likely it is that the possibility of
repeal would have induced taxpayers to ignore the tax exemption in the first place, a result that would
have minimized the loss of social welfare attributable to the exemption.  In such a situation, then, a
transition norm of nominal retroactivity would be best, because the expectation of such a repeal would
have done the most to prevent reliance on the tax exemption when it was enacted.  The next best rule,
following this argument, would be a transition rule of ungrandfathered nominal prospectivity, which
protects some subset, though not all, pre-transition investments; and full prospectivity, or grandfather
treatment, for all pre-transition owners of tax-exempt bonds would produce the worst outcome
because taxpayers, even if they knew the exemption would eventually be repealed, would still be
induced to invest in reliance on it, as their investment would be fully protected from retroactive taxation. 
Now consider how all of these conclusions change if the legal progress assumption is relaxed. 
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Assume instead that the latest economic research reveals that the bond exemption has in fact been very
beneficial overall to the economy and that, if left in place, would continue to maximize overall societal
welfare.  Under this assumption, repealing the provision would by definition be a bad idea.  In that case,
the best transition policy would be one of full transition relief, perhaps in the form of a promise to
grandfather any future repeal, because such a norm would maximize taxpayer reliance on the welfare-
enhancing exemption, despite the risk of its being repealed.  Thus, if the legal progress assumption is
replaced with a legal regress assumption (that is, if it is assumed that repeal of a particular tax subsidy
provision would reduce social welfare), then a transition norm of full transition relief, or something close
to it, would be optimal.
3. Summary
These tort and tax examples highlight the most troublesome issue for the consequentialists’
transitions framework: If the choice of the optimal transition policy depends on the plausibility in various
contexts of the legal progress assumption, the question then is how to determine which areas of law (if
any) will generally move in a desirable direction, and which not?  Can we ever say definitively that tort
law should move in a particular direction or that particular tax code provisions should be maintained or
eliminated?  And even if it were possible to define areas of legal progress (or, for that matter, legal
regress), it would remain unclear whether such categories could be drawn sufficiently precisely as to
allow for the creation of transition norms that distinguish the former from the latter.  Framed this way,
the legal progress question poses a potentially insurmountable obstacle for the incentive- or
anticipation-based argument for retroactivity.  Given how difficult it is for legal policymakers and
scholars to reach consensus on basic normative legal issues – questions concerning what the law ought
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to look like in any given area –  it seems unlikely that there will be consensus on the question concerning
where the law in a particular area is headed and whether that direction is generally desirable.  The
practical difficulties with coming to terms with a legal regress assumption are even more profound. 
Even if we could identify areas of true legal regress, areas where we expected the law to move in a bad
direction (or at least not in a consistently positive direction), adopting a transition norm based on that
assumption would be deeply problematic.  Imagine asking Congress to adopt a transition rule of
applying tax law changes prospectively only because such changes are expected in general to be
undesirable.70  Thus, perhaps the best that can be hoped for is to identify general types of law or legal
change that can be expected to move, over the long run, in a generally (even if not uniformly) desirable
direction.  And those would then be areas where it would make sense to adopt a strong norm of
retroactivity, from the incentive- or anticipation-based perspective.  
C. Taking Legal Progress Seriously
This section attempts to take the idea of legal progress seriously in two ways.  First, it hints at
the sort of analysis that would be required to identify general categories of legal change with respect to
which progress is more or less likely.  Second, this section discusses two examples of types legal
change that present exceptionally strong cases for adopting a legal progress assumption.  Also, as
discussed in Part III above, these examples happen to be strong cases for the rational expectations
assumption as well.  As a result, these are examples for which the consequentialist incentive-based
justification for retroactivity is strongest.  As a preliminary matter, however, let us consider briefly how
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one might go about identifying areas of legal progress.
1.  Courts vs. Legislatures: Evolutionary Theories and Interest-Group Politics
If it is possible to identify categories of legal change that can be expected to move in a desirable
direction over time, the most promising approach may lie in some sort of structural or political
explanation.  Thus, an obvious distinction might be drawn between legal change that emanates from
courts and legal change that emanates from legislatures.  The idea would not be that judges are any
smarter or more public-spirited than legislators, but would be that the judicial process – or the process
of case law adjudication – is more likely than the legislative process to produce desirable or social-
welfare-enhancing outcomes over time.  There is an ambitious version of this claim, and a more modest
version.  
The ambitious version harkens back to a movement in law-and-economics scholarship that
reached its peak during the 1970s and early 1980s in which scholars put forth models to explain why
the common law should be expected to tend towards efficiency.  Motivated by Richard Posner’s
famous claim that the common law could best be understood as furthering the goal of economic
efficiency,71 a number of scholars set out to do what Posner had not (at least not originally) attempted
to do: to identify a selection mechanism by which the common law might evolve toward efficiency.  The
arguments were creative, if not wholly persuasive.  For example, one argument built on the idea that,
because inefficient rules produced relatively large social losses, such rules would have a greater
likelihood of being litigated – and thus would be more likely on average to be overturned, the result
being that inefficient rules would tend to be selected out for extinction and, by default, efficient rules for
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George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
65 (1977); and John Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of the Common Law, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978).  See also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a
Private Good, 8 J. Legal Stud. 235, 261 (1979) (arguing that efficient rules would have a greater
tendency to be litigated but that, because of precedential effects, such a tendency would lead the
common law toward efficient outcomes).
73 There are, of course, many reasons to doubt the optimistic evolutionary story concerning the
common law.  For starters, the argument assumes that inefficient rules impose concentrated losses,
leading to repeated litigation and eventual changes in the rule.  If, however, the social costs caused by
inefficient rules were instead widely dispersed, the selection mechanism would fail, as individuals would
not have an increased incentive to litigate even the most inefficient rules.   See, e.g., Richard A. Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law 573-75 (6th ed. 2003) (pointing out some of the flaws in the evolution-
towards-efficiency story).   Again, however, if judges are assumed to care about efficiency (as well as
about the precedential effect of their decisions), it becomes much easier to tell a plausible evolution-
towards-efficiency type of story.  Id.  It is worth noting here that arguments concerning the evolutionary
trend of the common law towards efficiency are distinct from, though similar in some respects to,
arguments concerning the tendency of social norms to evolve towards efficiency.  See, e.g., Robert
Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984); Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World:
A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1225 (1997).  For a recent
argument that even repeat-play interactions, in the presence of so-called “mismatch risk,” will not
necessarily lead to the selection of efficient norms, see Paul G. Mahoney & Chris W. Sanchirico,
Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2027
(2001).  The recent literature on the proper interaction between norms and institutions, including courts,
is of course voluminous.
74 It is conventional wisdom in law-and-economics circles that the primary goal of the common
law ought to be some version of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  This is not to say, of course, that law-and-
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survival.72  In addition, if one is allowed to assume that judges themselves tend to place value on the
goal of efficiency in their decisions (either for reasons of personal politics or perceived institutional
comparative advantage), the evolutionary story strengthens considerably.73  
Although these evolution-towards-efficiency arguments concerning the common law purport to
be only positive or predictive in nature, they are consistent with (and complementary to) well known
normative arguments for promoting efficiency through the common law.74  What is interesting for
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economics scholars care only about efficiency.  To the contrary, most legal economists willing to be
explicit about their normative commitments tend to favor some version of utilitarianism, or welfarism
more generally, which can accommodate concerns of distributive justice.  Law and economics scholars
do, however, hold to the idea of a separation of functions between institutions, with the common law or
private law fields (such as tort, property, and contracts) focusing exclusively on wealth maximization
and the tax-and-transfer regime being the exclusive tool for wealth redistribution.  See generally Kyle
Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Tort Rules, and Insurance, Tax L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2003).
75 There is an alternative account of legislative change that is more optimistic, and such an
optimistic story can be grounded in a similar sort of evolutionary model.  See, e.g., Jack Hirshleifer,
Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation Versus Conflict Strategies, in 4 Research in
Law and Economics 1, 47 (observing that evolution-towards-efficiency stories are “by no means
limited to the arena of common law litigation.  With minimal modifications the same logic can be applied
also to the forces determining statute law and constitutional interpretation.”); see also Levmore, supra
note 12, at 1662-63 (applying a relatively optimistic evolutionary story as to the ability of various types
of law, including legislation, to make progress over time).
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purposes of this analysis is that, for those scholars who see the common law as generally moving in the
direction of efficiency and who see that as a desirable trend, the consequentialist transitions framework
– and, most importantly, the incentive-based argument for retroactivity – should have special
resonance.  Thus, it should come as no surprise that the argument for applying court decisions
retroactively would be the most universally accepted application of the consequentialist framework at
least within the law and economics community. 
Given the amount of intellectual energy that has been directed toward defending, positively and
normatively, the efficiency of the common law, it is striking how few law-and-economics scholars have
explicitly made similar sorts of evolutionary arguments with respect to legislative change.  For whatever
reason, such arguments have gotten less attention than their common-law counterparts and certainly
have not taken hold in the literature.75  To the contrary, if there is a general trend in legislative
scholarship in recent years, it would be in a much more pessimistic direction.  A principal contribution
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76 There is also a cycling, or oscillation, story that can be told about shifts in the common law
between the use of rules and the use of standards.  Jason Scott Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and the
Torts Process: An Economic Analysis of Legal Form, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 341 (1991).
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of the public-choice movement in legal and political science scholarship, for example, is to emphasize
the extent to which legislative and sometimes regulatory outcomes can be best understood in terms of
interest-group conflict and redistributions of wealth and power among such groups.  Applying this lens
to the transitions debate, an obvious conclusion to draw would be that legislative change in any given
area should not be expected necessarily to evolve towards efficiency, or towards any other conception
of the general good for that matter.   By the same token, however, there would be no compelling
reason to expect legislative change necessarily to move in a steadily worse direction, from the
perspective of overall optimality.  Rather, the clearer prediction of public-choice analysis might be that
legislative change would tend to move in cycles, as various well-organized and relatively narrow interest
groups, in effect, compete (and sometimes collude) to enrich themselves at the expense of the diffuse
majority of taxpayers, who, except on rare occasions involving high-salience reform movements
(perhaps organized by the proverbial policy “entrepreneurs”), are relatively powerless to prevent such
abuse.76
This pessimistic account of legislative change, which admittedly is a caricature of the public-
choice position, leads to the more modest version of the claim that legal progress is more likely to
characterize court decisions than legislative decisions: that is, even if one is not fully convinced of the
general efficiency of the common law, it has got to be better than most legislative lawmaking.  The idea
is that the legislative process is often dominated by well-organized and relatively narrow interest groups
that have, at best, only an indirect interest in promoting overall social welfare (and a very direct interest
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77 It is true that lawsuits too can have an effect similar to a redistributive tax on a widely diffuse
group.  For example, a series of products liability verdicts against the manufacturers of a given type of
product will tend to increase the price of that product, thus passing the cost of the litigation on to the
(perhaps oblivious) consumers.  Even in such cases, however, the consumer’s interests are being
represented by, on the one hand, the plaintiffs (who are in essence “lobbying” for safer products) and
the defendants (who are trying to hold costs down).  And the judges or juries who adjudicate these
claims are much less likely to be in a position to accept side payments in exchange for a favorable
decision for either side – less likely, that is, than a legislative decision-maker.  Those who are more
optimistic about the legislative process (even if they are realistic about the relative likelihood of
corruption) will expect to see similar alignments of interests between diffuse taxpayer groups and certain
well organized groups.  And those who are more pessimistic about the judicial process will doubt this
picture of the unity of interest among consumers, products liability plaintiffs, manufacturers. 
Nevertheless, the basic point seems to hold: judicial decision-making – and thus the legal change that
occurs as the common law evolves – seems less subject to untoward interest group influence, and thus
somewhat more likely to produce legal progress (albeit incrementally), than is the case for legislative
decision making.
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in redistributing to themselves); whereas, the same jaundiced assessment cannot be applied to the
judicial process,  at least not to nearly the same degree.  And although there are obvious limits to the
use of courts as a means of social policymaking, those same limits prevent the court system from being
used to implement large-scale illegitimate redistribution.  The most obvious difference, of course, is that
to redistribute through the court system, it is necessary for one party to sue another.  The beneficiaries
of the redistribution (or their representatives) must formally notify the target of the redistribution (or their
representatives) that redistribution is being sought; and the latter have a chance to defend themselves
against the former.  By contrast, in the legislative process, the most troublesome type of redistribution
(exemplified proverbially by pork-barrel legislation) typically gets enacted without the average
taxpayer’s ever knowing about it.  If this stylized picture has any real-world validity, there is a case,
then, for having somewhat more confidence in the legal progress assumption in the judicial setting than
in the legislative setting.77 
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78 Again, a version of this example, or of the variant that involves a retroactive product ban, is
almost always cited as the paradigmatic case illustrating the consequentialist’s incentive-based argument
for nominal retroactivity.
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These political and functional distinctions between courts and legislatures, and the resulting
effects on the likelihood of good law or bad law emanating from either source, almost certainly have
some important explanatory and justificatory power with respect to the existing transition norms.  In the
next sections, however, I want to take the analysis further, by trying to identify two cases of legal
change in which (a) legal progress of a certain sort is especially likely (that is, optimism regarding the
path of law in these examples is, in my view, warranted), and (b) the rational expectations assumption
seems most likely to apply.  Thus, I will identify two examples of legal change with respect to which the
consequentialist incentive-based justification of retroactivity is likely to have the most force.  Put
differently, if retroactivity is not a good idea in these cases, it may never be a good idea.  These
examples, unsurprisingly, are the ones I have been emphasizing throughout the article: involving
expanding tort law and eliminating tax shelters.
2.  The Products Liability Example (one more time): Incorporating Scientific Progress
The first example I want to discuss involves court decision, or perhaps the decisions of a
regulatory agency.  In particular, let us return to the products liability example of Acme the widget-
maker.  Why is nominal retroactivity so obviously the right transition norm in that case, besides the
structural/political story from the previous section?78   Consider the following two factors: First is the
plausibility of the rational expectations assumption here, as discussed in Part III above.  Second is the
plausibility of the legal progress assumption, which is what this section is focusing on.  Recall that the
only legal transition that occurred in the Acme widget story was the incorporation by the courts of the
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latest scientific evidence concerning the causal link between widgets and the harm in question.  What
makes this tort example so compelling is that the legal change in question is not a change in the
substantive liability rule or in the choice of a measure of damages, but is an example of the law (here a
court) simply resolving uncertainty as to the application of existing law.  And the uncertainty resolution
in this case happens to take the form of law incorporating a change in science.  In fact, one might
reasonably question whether this example represents a legal transition at all, as legal change is
conventionally understood.  However, there can be no doubt that this sort of resolution of uncertainty
as to the application of existing law clearly (and rightly) fits within the notion of legal change set out by
the consequentialist framework.  
The importance of scientific progress to this particular example, however, cannot be
overestimated.  In my view, to the extent that judicial (or, for that matter, legislative) legal change can
be characterized as primarily involving incorporation of new scientific discoveries, the case for applying
the changes retroactively, assuming the effected parties can be expected to have rational expectations
with respect to such discoveries, is reasonably strong.  This conclusion is admittedly based in large part
on the view that science (by which I mean the so-called “hard sciences”) itself makes progress over
time.  This is a view that has some force, notwithstanding Thomas Kuhn’s arguments to the contrary.79   
Kuhn famously argued that science should not be understood as making cumulative progress
over time.  On Kuhn’s view there are periods of “normal science,” when progress is made within the
existing scientific “paradigm.”  In Kuhn’s view, however, although there may be long periods of
progress within normal science, crises will eventually arise within the prevailing scientific paradigms,
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80 Id. at 162-63.
81 To some extent, in fact, he revised his views in response to these criticisms.   Thomas S.
Kuhn, The Road Since Structure (2000) (eds.  James Conant and John Haugeland).  
82 Kuhn, supra note 83, at 162-63.
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typically prompted by problems that could not be solved using the extant assumptions.  Such crises then
sometimes, though not always, get resolved through what Kuhn calls a “scientific revolution” in which a
new paradigm replaces all or part of the old one.  The move from Ptolemaic to Copernican astronomy
is the classic example.80   Critically, Kuhn argues that such periods of revolution should not generally be
understood as being cumulative in any meaningful sense, which had been the previously prevailing view
of scientific progress.  When such a revolution occurs, Kuhn says, the previous knowledge is
considered, not just out of date, but largely wrong and is often discarded, sometimes no longer even to
be taught to young scientists except in history-of-science classes.  Kuhn’s views have been highly
controversial within the scientific community, and I will not rehearse the criticisms here.81  It should be
noted, however, that Kuhn regarded science as being the one field of inquiry in which progress, at least
during periods of stable paradigms, could actually be made:  “If we doubt, as many do, that non-
scientific fields make progress, that cannot be because individual schools make none.  Rather, it must
be because competing schools, each of which constantly questions the very foundations of the others. 
The man who argues that philosophy, for example, has made no progress emphasizes that there are still
Aristotelians, not that Aristotelianism has made no progress.”82 
Whatever Kuhn’s views may have been, there is a sense in which it is impossible to deny that
there has been some degree of progress in science over the centuries.  We obviously know more now
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83 A true skeptic might here point out that for many centuries the prevailing view among medical
“scientists” was that bleeding was a useful response to a wide range of health problems, and that to
suggest otherwise at the time would have seemed preposterous.  And yet here we are, in an age and
living under a medical paradigm in which the general view among modern doctors is decidedly anti-
bleeding.  This observation is difficult to answer.  Perhaps the best response is to say that, if I had a
time machine that would allow me to go either backward or forward to find medical remedies to
whatever current illness I have, I, for one, would much prefer to go forward in time; and I suspect most
others would as well.
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about the causes of and how to treat some diseases than we did 100, 200, or 500 years ago.  That
medical science has made advances is self evident.  The eradication of polio and small pox, for
example, have to be evidence of major scientific progress, not to mention the technological and
engineering marvels represented by the personal computer and the automobile.  There are of course the
occasional, well-publicized scientific reversals, such as the recent news about hormone replacement
therapy, when a scientific consensus takes a sudden about-face.  But such reversals are most
remarkable for their rarity.  Moreover, once the science gets to a certain point, when a basic conclusion
having been confirmed repeatedly by study after study for many years, reversals seem extraordinarily
unlikely.  For example, it is almost inconceivable at this point that, given the volumes of studies done
over many years linking tobacco use to various illnesses, there will come a future point at which the
tobacco companies will be fully scientifically exonerated (although legal exoneration may still be
possible).83  
Unlikely as they may be, scientific reversals nevertheless do occur, and when they do they can
produce two types of error relevant to product safety regulation.  Some products thought harmless will
later turn out to be harmful (a false negative), and some thought harmful will be found to be harmless (a
false positive).  When designing transition policy in this context, then, it is important to understand the
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circumstances in which false negatives and false positives are relatively easy to remedy, and when they
present problems that cannot easily be fixed.  False negatives, for example, are relatively easily fixed by
the use of nominal retroactivity itself, so long as the rational expectations assumption applies and so long
as manufacturers are not judgment proof.  The Acme-widget example from above involves the
response to an initial false negative error on the part of science.  Widgets were initially believed to be
harmless.  However, when that error was corrected by the accumulation of scientific knowledge to the
contrary, the new information could be readily incorporated into the law through a nominally retroactive
finding of liability.  And expecting the application of such a retroactivity transition norm, Widget
manufacturers would have been given the incentive to root out and anticipate just the sort of false
negatives that were eventually discovered and corrected by the courts in this example.  
That conclusion, of course, again assumes rational expectations on the part of product
manufacturers.  Such an assumption, according to some commentators, is unwarranted with respect to
some product risks, in particular, product risks that could not possibly (or could not reasonably) have
been anticipated even by sophisticated product manufacturers.  The standard example of this is the
asbestos case.  There, the argument goes, the definitive studies linking asbestos exposure to various
lung diseases involved epidemiological studies of huge populations of exposed individuals and required
a fairly long period of time to sort out.  Until those studies were completed, no one knew there was a
link, and once those studies were completed, everyone knew; and as soon as they knew, the
manufacturers of asbestos largely stopped making it, and users stopped using it.  And all of this
happened well before any asbestos manufacturer was found liable in tort.  If a reasonable amount of
investment in research and development by the manufacturer would not have changed that result, then
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84 Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances
and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. Legal Stud. 689 (1985).
85 In the alternative, retroactive liability could be subject to be applied using a sort of fault or
reasonableness standard of the following sort: If the product maker is found not to have invested
reasonably in research and development into the harmfulness of its products, we will hold it
retroactively liable for the harm its products cause.  This is similar to the rule favored by Alan Schwartz,
supra.  However, if we thought courts generally lack the competence to determine ex post what the
optimal ex ante amount of research and development is, we might prefer an enterprise liability
approach.
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making the law-change retroactive may not have the desired internalizing effect.84  Likewise in our
example, if Acme could not have known that widgets would cause harm, because the studies revealing
the harm would not be available until years after the widgets in question had already been made, sold,
and used by the victims, then a transition norm of nominal retroactivity would have had little incentive
benefit.  Because it may be difficult or impossible, however, for a court hearing a products case after
the fact to determine whether the manufacturer ex ante could reasonably have anticipated a given type
of risk, we may decide nevertheless to impose retroactive enterprise liability in order to make sure that
manufacturers have the proper incentive to invest in research and development with respect to such
risks.85  
What then of the problem of false positives – when a product is initially found to cause harm,
but subsequent science proves that conclusion wrong?  Such errors seem especially difficult to remedy
or reverse.  Take for example a situation with all the hallmarks of a mass tort: there is a large group of
plaintiffs alleging a present injury that they say was caused by exposure many years in the past (or over
a period of many years) to the manufacturer’s product; and the plaintiffs are asking the court to hold the
manufacturer liable, even though there is no definitive, irrefutable scientific evidence that the product
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86 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
87 Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).   In Daubert, which involved
tort suits against the makers of the anti-nausea drug Bendectin, the Court held that judges applying the
Federal Rules of Evidence must rule on the admissibility of expert scientific testimony by engaging in a
two-part analysis.  First, the judge must determine whether the expert's testimony reflects scientific
knowledge, whether his or her findings are based on the scientific method, and whether his or her work
product amounts to "good science.”  Second, the judge must ensure that the expert testimony is
relevant and that it logically advances a material aspect of the party's case.  Id. at 589-92.  
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caused the plaintiffs’ harms.  Now imagine that the court finds for the plaintiffs and holds the company
liable.  If this holding at some later dates is shown to have been a mistake (based on subsequent
scientific research), there is no obvious remedy for the manufacturer, who may well be in bankruptcy
due to a plethora of such cases (hence the term “mass” tort) and may not be easily compensated for this
disaster.   And indeed, if this sort of holding amounts to a destructive taking, of the sort discussed in
Part IV.A. above, we may not want to compensate the manufacturer in this, lest manufacturers not be
given an incentive to anticipate the possibility of being wrongly held liable and having their businesses
wiped out by a single lawsuit.  We may want manufacturers to anticipate the possibility just as we want
them to anticipate hurricanes and earthquakes.
One response to the problem of scientific reversals, however, is to set a relatively high
evidentiary standard for courts hearing certain types of cases.  For example, under the old Frye test,
courts faced with the question of the admissibility of scientific evidence would ask whether that
evidence was “generally accepted” within the relevant scientific field.86  This standard has now been
replaced by the considerably more liberal (that is, less exclusive) formulation found in the Federal Rules
of Evidence, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the Daubert case.87  The analysis of this Part
suggests that this liberalization of the admissibility rules with respect to scientific evidence may be
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unwise for tort cases involving a substantial degree of retroactive liability –  for example, the typical
mass tort, long-latency products cases.  While evidentiary standards in tort cases involving scientific
evidence can be set too low (raising the likelihood of false positives), they can also be set too high. 
And if that happens, even fully retroactive tort law could never deter, as science might never
conclusively find causation, even if there was considerable evidence of harm.  I do not claim here to
know what the optimal evidentiary standard is for products liability cases.  My only point is that the
choice of the appropriate evidentiary standard is one tool for dealing with the problem of false positives;
whereas, the problem of false negatives are generally less serious. 
To summarize, the prevailing norm of nominal retroactivity with respect to products liability
decisions seems to find support in the consequentialist transitions framework, for several reasons.  First,
as discussed in Part III above, product manufacturers are likely to exhibit rational expectations with
respect to both likelihood of their being held liable in tort and the likely transition norm.  Second, there
are structural reasons to expect legal progress to be more likely in the case of judicial decisions than in
the case of legislative decisions.  Third, the legal progress assumption seems especially applicable in the
products context, insofar as legal change here tends to be tied closely to scientific progress.  Finally,
even insofar as there are worries about the effects of scientific errors on products liability cases, those
worries can be reduced by carefully calibrating evidentiary rules.  
3.    The Tax Reform Cycle
It seems to be the prevailing view among U.S. tax scholars that there is little reason to be
optimistic about the long term future of the tax code overall.  That is, despite a growing consensus
among those scholars that tax reform of one sort or another (such as legislation to broaden the tax base
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he offers, among other things, a public-choice account of why tax law cannot be expected to progress
over time.  See, e.g, Shaviro, supra note 2, at 86-91.
89 Id. at 86-87; see also J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the
Protection Racket: A Reply to Professors Graetz and Kaplow, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1155, 1162-66 (1989). 
90 Id. at 1165.
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a flatten the rates) would be a good idea, the prospect of serious and lasting reform of the tax laws
seems unlikely.88  Part of the problem, of course, is that even tax scholars who agree that the current
tax code is a mess cannot agree on what the optimal or ideal tax regime would look like.  But there is a
more profound problem: Irrespective of the latest scholarly view (whether there is a consensus or not),
the real world tax code is more likely to be shaped by interest-group politics than by academic
research.  To put the point in standard public-choice terms, the well-organized and interested few
(namely, those taxpayers who tend to benefit from a particular tax subsidy and who tend therefore to
lobby in favor of its enactment and against its repeal) should be expected to win out in over the poorly
organized and dispersed taxpaying general public, whose taxes will have to go up to pay for the various
tax subsidy provisions.89   As Professors Ramseyer and Nakazato put the point in their critique of a
legal progress assumption in the tax legislative context, “if there is no political constituency for efficient
tax regimes, neither is there any general evolutionary mechanism that will cause them to develop.”90  
All of this is not to say, however, that one should expect the tax law to get steadily worse over
time.  Rather, the better prediction would be one of cyclical swings in tax policy, with a period during
which various tax subsidy or tax expenditure provisions are enacted (at the behest of various interest
groups, including some economists who may believe that such provisions are good for the economy),
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91 Shaviro makes a similar assessment of the future path of tax law:
Given the lengthy period over which income tax politics has
been unfolding, there is no general reason why we should
expect things to be getting either systematically better or worse. 
Applying this assumption in light of the CTB [comprehensive
tax base] norm and related skepticism about tax politics, tax
base changes are close to random from the standpoint of good
policy; they are not much more likely to improve the tax law
than to worsen it.
Shaviro, supra note 2, at 99-100 (footnote omitted).
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followed perhaps by brief episodes of tax reform in which many of the subsidies are repealed and a
more “comprehensive tax base” is adopted,  followed in turn by periods of new subsidies (or new
versions of the old subsidies), and so on.  Again, there are disagreements about the desirability of both
the tax subsidy provisions, and the comprehensive tax base idea.  Nevertheless, almost no tax expert
worth his or her salt would bet money on a prediction that Congress over time will tend to improve the
overall tax code.91   As a result, the consequentialist preference for nominal retroactivity on incentive or
anticipation grounds just does not make sense for most legislative tax-law change, and the anti-nominal-
retroactivity norm that currently prevails does.
4.   Revisiting the Tax Shelter Problem:  Tax Shelter Deterrence as Legal Progress
There is a type of tax law change, however, with respect to which nominal retroactivity makes
sense on incentive grounds.  As I argued in Part III.D. above, tax law changes that serve only to
eliminate tax shelters can have much the same welfare-enhancing incentive effect as a nominally
retroactive tort liability decision.  In making this argument, I am associating myself with those tax
scholars who have argued that tort-like standards can have an important cost-internalizing role in the
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normally “rule-based” system of the Internal Revenue Code, in particular, an important role in deterring
tax-motivated transactions that are based on highly aggressive interpretations of the tax laws.92  I agree
with that position, and I would take the point one short step further: Just as with the application of tort
standards in the products liability context, the application of anti-abuse standards in the tax context
ought to be applied nominally retroactively, not only by courts (as is already the case) but by the
Treasury Department when it issues new shelter-defeating regulations and even by the Congress when it
closes loopholes legislatively.
In Part III.D. above, I made the case that, with respect to such tax law changes, the rational
expectations assumption almost certainly applies.  More to the point, if it applies anywhere, it applies
with respect to tax shelter behavior by corporate taxpayers, or to any taxpayer who has retained
sophisticated tax counsel.  Now the question is why one would expect such changes to tend toward
legal progress.  That is, if we are to adopt a norm of nominal retroactivity with respect to anti-tax-abuse
actions by the government, what confidence do we have that such actions will tend on average to be
desirable?  That is a fair question, and the answer is similar though not identical to the one provided in
the products liability context. 
First, with respect to judicial decisions applying anti-tax-abuse principles against taxpayers,
there is a structural/political argument similar to the one already discussed.  Courts, including courts
hearing tax cases, are relatively well insulated from interest group influence.  Second, it is my intuition,
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abusive tax avoidance leads to excessive complexity in the tax laws, see Weisbach, supra note 92. 
Weisbach thus argues in favor of greater use in the tax area of more general anti-abuse standards.  Id.
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though I cannot prove it, that the Treasury Department is, as agencies go, relatively insulated from
political influence as well, in part because of the wide diversity of constituencies it represents and in part
because of the culture of that institution.  Moreover, even if the Treasury Department (and the IRS)
were susceptible to undue influence by some particular constituency, it seems highly unlikely that
Treasury decisions to stop abusive tax avoidance would be a product of such influence.  That is, if the
Treasury Department were somehow to manage, despite powerful political interests to the contrary, to
shut down a particular tax shelter, we should have some confidence that the change is optimal from a
societal perspective.  Third, if this argument has any force, it should apply not only to agency actions
but to legislative efforts to shut down tax shelters as well.  Thus, there is a class of tax legislative change
that, in my view, is more likely than not over time to move in the direction of progress, and that is
targeted rule-based anti-abuse legislation – by which I mean, tax legislation designed to correct a
particular abusive misinterpretation of a given code section or sections.93
It is important to my analysis that this example involves the elimination, by some arm of the
government (whether a court, an agency, or the legislature) of ambiguity in the tax statute.  That is, tax
shelters – or abusive tax-avoidance transactions – by definition depend on “aggressive” interpretations
of legislative language.  It is well understood that Congress when enacting particular language in the
Internal Revenue Code cannot possibly anticipate all conceivable interpretations and thus cannot
eliminate those interpretations that tend systematically to benefit sophisticated taxpayers or taxpayers
with sophisticated tax advisors.  And taxpayers, absent a credible threat of retroactivity, will have a
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powerful incentive to look for such latent (and, again, inevitable) ambiguities and to interpret them
systematically in their favor.  That is what tax lawyers do.  And this systematic bias with respect to tax
law interpretation will exist no matter what the likelihood of audit and ultimate detection and no matter
what the penalty for engaging in such transactions, if anti-abuse tax transitions are not applied
nominally retroactively.   This is because there will always remain the incentive to exploit existing
ambiguities at least until they are found out by either the Treasury Department or Congress, so long as
taxpayers can expect that they will at least get to benefit from their self-serving interpretation during the
interim period.  The Acme-widget example is apt here.  If widget-makers knew that any court decision
holding them liable for the harms caused by their product (or any regulatory decision banning their
product) would be grandfathered, there would be an enormous financial incentive for them to ignore
those harms costs until the decision actually came down.  Indeed, they might even temporarily have the
reverse incentive: to accelerate widget production before the change is made in order to receive a
short-term windfall gain.  Analogously, to grandfather anti-tax-abuse decisions would produce a similar
incentive to actually increase the use of tax shelters prior to legislative or regulatory repeal.  
In sum, the very nature of the tax compliance situation creates a dynamic in which there is a
systematic bias towards abusive, self-serving, and hence nonoptimal interpretations of the tax laws. 
Thus, there is reason to believe that legislative and regulatory decisions – just as much as judicial
decisions – eliminating such interpretations would tend to be welfare enhancing.  The conclusion that
then follows from the consequentialist transitions framework is straightforward:  The more retroactive
such decisions can be, the better.  This conclusion obviously ignores the public choice dynamic
discussed in Part II, whereby the move to a transition norm of retroactivity would increase the incentive
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of those who benefit from the abusive interpretations of the tax laws to expend political resources to
stop this particular type of desirable legal change – the elimination of those interpretations.94  Therefore,
introducing a new norm of nominal retroactivity for regulatory and legislative anti-tax-abuse transitions –
to bring them in line with the norm that applies to judicial decisions – may reduce the likelihood of such
desirable transition.  This is the sort of tradeoff between political and efficiency concerns that plague
virtually all examples of legal transitions, certainly legislative transitions; and the ultimate consequentialist
conclusion may be that something short of full nominal retroactivity should be the norm.  However, the
main point of my analysis here is to emphasize the clear incentive-based or anticipation-based benefits
of a retroactivity norm in this context.  
V.  Conclusion
This Article has argued that the prevailing normative framework for evaluating legal transitions – 
the consequentialist or economic framework – relies critically on two assumptions: the assumption that
private parties (whose incentives are sought to be affected by the choice of transition norm) will behave
with rational expectations and the assumption that the law will tend to change in a desirable direction. 
Perhaps the most important, and certainly the most well-known, insight of the consequentialist
framework has been that, if both of these assumptions hold, a powerful case can be made in favor of a
norm of applying legal change retroactively.   To the extent, however, that these assumptions do not
apply, the case for retroactivity becomes considerably weaker, at least on incentive- or anticipation-
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grounds.  I have argued that those assumptions are quite likely to apply – and hence a retroactivity
norm will likely make good sense – with respect to two fairly narrow types of legal change: expansions
in products liability law that are based on the incorporation of the latest (adequately confirmed)
scientific discoveries, and moves, by Congress, courts, or the IRS to eliminate abusive tax shelter
transactions.  In both of those cases, there is a strong case to be made that the relevant parties –
manufacturers in one and sophisticated taxpayers in the other – can rationally predict the future course
of law and its application to them.  And there is a strong case that these types of legal change will tend
to be desirable.  One way of putting my conclusion is that, if retroactivity is ever going to make sense
on incentive grounds, it will make sense in these cases.  The more interesting question, perhaps, is
whether there are any other examples.  Put differently, besides these two examples, how much real
world significance does the consequentialists’ incentive-based arguments for retroactivity have?  That is
a good question.  
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